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Labour Market and Social Policy in Italy:  
Challenges and Changes
dimensions analysed by the Social Justice Index. Italy 
ranks in the bottom third of all the main categories 
of the index and 25th out of the 28 EU countries overall. 
From a labour market perspective, Italy experienced a 
slight improvement in 2015 in comparison to 2014,  
but this was a general trend across all EU Member States 
and the extent of its improvement remained strictly 
below average.
Out of all the Social Justice Index subcategories, the 
one on intergenerational justice is the most worrying, 
ranking 27th overall. This is a source of concern for a 
Executive Summary
The Great Recession hit Italy at a time of protracted  
structural weakness, affected by two decades of  
sluggish productivity growth and a high ratio of  
public debt to GDP. Almost ten years later, Italy has 
not solved its two main problems and is affected by  
a social emergency that can be observed in all of the 
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country characterised by the highest elderly depend-
ency ratio in the EU. Greater labour market partici-
pation of working age people should then be one of 
the main policy targets. Efforts have been made and 
results achieved, but they remain insufficient and 
more needs to be done.
The situation has worsened in recent years, with the 
great majority of employment indicators reaching 
their lowest levels in 2014 and only small improve-
ments being recorded during the last year. Italy has 
found itself in a situation of prolonged emergency, hit 
by crises in the financial and banking system, as well 
as in the labour market; it is also one of the countries 
that has been most affected by the refugee crisis. It  
is clear to see that, in recent years, the political system 
has struggled to cope with all of these emergencies: 
the incumbent government, in office since February 
2014, holds the longest tenure of any administration 
since 2011. The recovery, albeit modest, has given 
Italy some room to tackle its main weaknesses.
During 2016, in order to avoid popular alienation and 
social exclusion, Italy finally decided to introduce un- 
employment assistance and social assistance schemes. 
These intentions are good and come at some relief for 
the European institutions, which have been encourag-
ing their introduction for several years. However,  
the jury is still out regarding their implementation.
Taking advantage of more favourable macroeconomic 
conditions, Italy should also act with a long-term 
perspective and lay the groundwork for future sustain-
able growth. On the one hand, a stronger emphasis  
on labour market access will have positive consequen- 
ces on the poverty rate and pension system. On the 
other hand, a greater investment in R&D, a reform of  
the tax wedge and improvements in education are  
pivotal to enhancing labour market productivity. 
Source: SIM Europe (Social Justice Index (SJI), 2015; Reform Barometer, 2016)
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1. 
Introduction
Italy suffered greatly from the crisis, which hit the 
country as it was already suffering at a macroeconomic 
level. The crisis, beginning in the financial sector, 
swiftly spread to the economic and social realms, and  
required a rapid response. The limited available resour- 
ces were used mainly for employment and income 
support policies (the so called “cassa integrazione in  
deroga”),1 and for tax credits. Political instability  
did not help in developing sound and comprehensive 
mid-term strategies: four different governments 
have been in office since 2008 (Berlusconi, Monti, Letta 
and Renzi), with four different labour ministers  
(Sacconi, Fornero, Giovannini and Poletti).
The results of this macroeconomic and political insta-
bility are clear. According to the Social Justice Index 
developed by Bertelsmann Stiftung:
“Italy’s performance in terms of social justice has fluctu- 
ated somewhat since 2008, and shows only a mini- 
mal improvement over its 2014 score of 4.60. How 
Italy measures up against the other EU-member  
countries varies somewhat across the six dimensions, 
though it consistently ranks among the bottom third  
in all six dimensions. It performs worst in terms of inter- 
generational justice, where it ranks second to last,  
and ranks 23rd in both labour market access as well  
as social cohesion and non-discrimination. With re- 
gard to our sub-index on children and youth, the 
country comes in on rank 23rd with a score of 4.44.” 
Overall, Italy ranks 25th out of all European countries, 
ahead of only Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. If we 
look at the relationship between GDP per capita and 
the Social Justice Index across Member States, we can 
see that Italy is significantly underperforming.2 
1   An exceptional wages guarantee fund which extended to entities previously excluded from the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, an earlier  
wages guarantee fund introduced in 1947, which represents one of the traditional tools of the complex Italian unemployment benefit system. 
2 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
Source: Social Justice Index (SJI), 2015
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In comparison with 2008, Italy lost half of a point, 
decreasing from 5.17 to 4.69. Of the 19 countries 
that were already included in the 2008 survey,3 only 
three had bigger index drops in absolute terms: 
Greece, Spain and Ireland. Still, the index highlights 
an uptick, given the rise in comparison to 2014. The 
rise is tiny in absolute terms, a mere 0.09, but it could 
prove to be a starting point.
Italy ranks 23rd for labour market access, 26th for 
employment rate (55.7%, ahead of just Croatia and 
Greece) and 16th for older employment rate ( 46.2%).  
It performs better in the low-skilled unemploy- 
ment rate (17%) at 13th. The low-skilled unemployment 
rate itself has nevertheless doubled since 2008. The 
unemployment rate is even worse given that more 
people entered the labour force after the outbreak  
of the crisis.4, 5 For instance, that rate almost doubled 
between 2008 and 2015, from 6.8% to 12.9%; on top  
of that, long-term unemployment was up to 7.8% from 
an initial 3.1%, and low skilled unemployment rose 
from 8.5% to 17%.6 
The situation in Italy is particularly hard for young 
people, in line with other Southern European countries. 
The youth unemployment rate more than doubled 
recently, up from 21.2% in 2008 to 42.7% in 2015 and 
the Child and Youth Opportunity ranking places Italy 
23rd out of 28 countries in terms of the opportunity it  
provides for the young. In addition, in this case,  
a negative trend was experienced in the 2008-2015 
period, but with a small uptick during the last year.7 
The level of NEET (Not in Education, Employment or 
Training) between 20 and 24 years old is, at 32%,  
the highest in Europe (followed by Greece, the second 
worst performer).8 Like all of the other Southern 
European countries, Italy also performs poorly in 
intergenerational justice. The ad hoc created sub-in-
dicator of the Social Justice Index ranks Italy as 
second from last. Family policies lag far below the 
European level (Italy ranks last in this regard) and 
there is little in place beyond maternity allowance. 
The cuts in financial transfers to lower government 
levels exacerbates the problem, given the wide range 
of welfare policies implemented at regional and local 
level. Italian society continues to rely heavily on fam- 
ilies within its welfare regime.
As for poverty and social exclusion prevention, Italy 
ranks 19th in the EU overall (the overall positions  
are marginally better for social exclusion prevention 
of children and the elderly, which are both 18th), 
with 28.1% of the Italian population at risk. The same 
applies to the percentage of the population in severe 
material deprivation, which stands at 11.5%.9 Italy also  
ranks 23rd in terms of its in-work poverty rate, 
which stands at 9.6%, being one of the most affected 
countries.10 The phenomenon changed structurally  
in recent years: in 2008, in-work poverty was com-
bined with lower work intensity; in 2014, the proba-
bility of being a working poor is mainly related to the 
payment of low hourly wages, especially to younger 
workers and other11 employees hired with “atypical” 
labour contracts not subject to collective bargaining 
(collectively agreed wages actually cover around half 
of the employees12).
As for gender equality issues, Italy has improved, but 
still remains the second worst performer in Europe, 
better only than Greece. Female participation in the 
labour market has improved constantly (from 39.9% 
in 1998 to 50.6% in 2015, according to Eurostat data), 
although it remains below the EU average of 64.3%. 
Some hope may be given by women’s representation 
3  The Social Justice Index gives a complete ranking of all the 28 Member States only from 2014. Formerly, these countries were  
not taken into account: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia.
4 This happened because more people entered the labour force to counteract potential job losses within the family.
5  https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LFACTTMAITQ647N
6 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Lecerf, M., Poverty in the European Union – The crisis and its aftermath, EPRS - European Parliamentary Research Service,  
 European Parliament, 2016.
11 Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”,  
 Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
12 http://www.wageindicator.org/main/salary/minimum-wage/italy
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at the political level: Italy is tenth among the 28 mem-
ber states for its presence of women in Parliament. 
Yet it is too early to assess broader effects on the Italian 
society as a whole.
Inequalities in Italy are also a serious cause for concern: 
its Gini coefficient ranks 20th out of the 28 Member 
age was employed, 10% below the EU average, ahead 
only of Greece and Croatia.15 Particularly troubling is 
the fact that Italian employment levels have been 
consistently below average, even before the crisis. The 
long-term unemployment rate more than doubled 
from 2008 to 2015, passing from 3.1% to 7.8%.16
The achievement of higher employment levels requires 
targeting specific - and weaker - segments of society. 
The main disadvantaged groups are easy to identify. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the situation  
of women in the labour market has markedly improved  
in the last 15 years, but remains significantly below 
the European average (-13.7 pp).17 Cultural reasons  
contribute to this outcome, as in Italy (and in South- 
ern European countries in general) household duties  
fall squarely on women’s shoulders, as well as the 
provision of care to both children and the elderly. The  
inadequate supply and quality of public welfare  
services (especially a widespread system of early child- 
hood care) further obstructs female participation  
in the labour market18 and increases the probability 
of women moving into, or remaining in, poverty. 
Single parents form another category that is closer 
to poverty than average, due to a lower participation 
rate (with a further and against the flow reduction 
2. 
Challenges
13 The age dependency ratio, old, is the ratio of older dependents (people older than 64) to the working-age population (those aged 15-64).  
 Data shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population.
14 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Source: Eurostat
18 Del Boca, D., M. Locatelli e D. Vuri, Child Care Choices by Italian Households, IZA Discussion Paper, N. 983, 2004.
States. The continuing need to reduce the public debt, 
now at 132.1% of GDP, limits any room for redistribu- 
tive policies. The fact that Italy comes last as regards 
its old age dependency ratio 13 and its demographic  
structure (among the top four countries with the great- 
est proportion of elderly people in Europe) 14 further 
increases the difficulties faced by policy makers. 
The four main challenges for Italy’s labour market and, 
more broadly, social inclusion policies are to:
1. significantly increase employment levels, especially 
for women and younger people; 
2. reduce income inequality and protect people at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion, especially children and 
young people; 
3. increase intergenerational equity, taking into 
account the difficult macroeconomic conditions and 
the unfavourable demographic structure;
4. reduce regional disparities between Northern and 
Southern Italy.
A well-functioning labour market with high 
employment level
As mentioned above, Italy displays the highest old age 
dependency ratio in the EU and is a Member State 
most in need of a well-functioning labour market with  
high employment opportunities. Yet, the labour 
market access score is only 4.63 according to the SJI 
index, underlining a poor performance on most of the 
indicators that comprise this dimension. In 2015,  
only 55.7% of the population between 15 and 64 years of 
6  
sim europe POLICY BRIEF #2016/02
during the crisis): the result is that in 2014 single 
parents at risk of poverty constitute 32.9% of the total,  
two thirds more than the national average of 19.9%.19 
Even though, as of 2015, Italy is among the top six  
spenders in Europe on Labour Market Policies (in-
cluding job search mechanisms, training, start-up 
incentives and unemployment benefits),20,21 one of 
the challenges it faces is to spend more effectively, 
especially in targeting these disadvantaged groups 
through activation measures.
Another important issue, strictly related to this one, 
is the effect of social benefits in tackling poverty.  
For example, the table below reports the percentage 
of people under 16 at risk of poverty before and after 
the introduction of social benefits.22 Italian policies 
became increasingly effective in tackling the risk  
of poverty during the period between 2008 and 2014. 
Their impact rose from 6.8 pp in 2008 to 8.1 pp in 
2014. A broader perspective, including evidence from 
other EU Member States, suggests, however, that 
their effectiveness in 2008 was limited rather than 
that of 2014 being good in its own right. In 2014, 
only Greek and Romanian welfare benefits produced 
a smaller effect than Italian ones, and outcomes of 
equivalent magnitude can be seen in Poland, Bulgaria 
and Portugal.23
Reduce income inequality and protect people at 
risk of poverty and social exclusion, especially 
children and young people
Structural weaknesses also threaten social cohesion.  
Italy has a high level of income inequality, as measured 
by a Gini coefficient equal to 0.327 in 2012, according 
to the OECD.24 The percentage of children and youth 
who are threatened by poverty or social exclusion 
(32%) clearly exceeds the proportion of older people 
(65 and above) at risk (20.8%). A child growing up in a 
poor and/or socially excluded environment has a much  
higher risk of continuing to live in such a state, remai- 
ning trapped in an intergenerational vicious cycle.25 
Table 1. Percentage of people under 16 years old at risk of poverty before and after the introduction of social benefits  
(including pensions, family allowances, children allowances, education allowances and sickness benefits, and other allowances)
Year Before Social Benefits After Social Benefits
2008 30.8 24.0
2009 31.5 23.7
2010 32.7 24.7
2011 32.7 25.6
2012 33.5 26.1
2013 33.5 24.9
2014 33.1 25.0
Source: Eurostat
19 Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”,  
 Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
20  European Commission, Analytical Web Note 1/2015, “EU Labour Market Policies: how active are we and how do we respond to unemployment?”, 
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=2389
21 OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LMPEXP
22 A list of 50 different macrogroups listed by EU-SILC, including pensions, family allowances, child allowances, education allowances and  
 sickness benefits.
23 Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”,  
 Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
24  https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm
25 “Piattaforma contro la povertà, La piattaforma europea contro la povertà e l’esclusione sociale: un quadro europeo per la coesione sociale  
 e territoriale”, 2011. Available at: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7003&langId=it 
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working time and place of work. If these conditions 
did not apply, these workers would represent bogus 
self-employed individuals, as they are obviously em-
ployees but are described as self-employed and  
they are subject to the same provisions as subordinate 
workers.33 The Istat Labour Force Survey allows us  
to identify bogus self-employed workers as respond-
ents are asked to specify if they; i) are required to 
work at the premises of their ‘employer/client’; ii) can 
or cannot autonomously decide their working time;  
iii) work for a single employer/client. In 2014, out of  
242,000 coordinated workers, 108,700 (44.9%) fea-
tures all the three indicators of subordination, while 
other 4,890 (2%) comply only with the first two 
indicators, therefore having two or more clients, but 
still being required by their main client to work at 
its premises and being obliged to observe a working 
time schedule. As for the 130,000 workers with  
casual self-employment contracts, 69,300 of them  
satisfy all the three conditions resembling sub- 
ordination (53.3%), and 78,460 (60.3%) the first two.
Finally, ethnic minorities (representing 8.33% of the 
overall population)34 are another group at risk of  
poverty and social exclusion; they have a participation 
rate in the labour market that is 7.8 pp higher than  
the national average and the risk of their becoming 
poor is more than twice the national average.35 
In this scenario, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung SJI, 
Italy’s inclusion policy scores just 4 out of 10 and  
the tax system’s redistributive functions “have largely 
ceased to work,” having “been curtailed by the rise  
in tax rates and the erosion of benefits and deductions  
Italy is 4.3% pp worse than the EU average for the 
proportion of people under 16 who are at risk of poverty, 
performing better than Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece only. The main tools of the Italian  
welfare state are in-kind transfers, but more effort, 
in terms of both resources allocated and efficiency, is 
the order of the day.26
In addition, we have already mentioned that the coun- 
try’s NEET rate in the age bracket 20 – 24 in 2014 is  
by far the highest across EU Member States: 32% of 
young people.27 NEETs are not only at a much higher 
risk of poverty than average, but they show a much 
higher societal disengagement (and therefore higher 
risk of social exclusion) and represent a high social 
cost, quantified as almost 2.5% of Italian GDP.28 The 
working poor are another relevant category at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, especially because they 
have tended to remain trapped in this disadvantaged 
status since the beginning of the crisis. Italy ranks 
23rd out of 28 in Europe for its in-work poverty rate 
which, as clarified above, is mainly a result of low  
salaries, rather than reduced working time.29, 30 A sub- 
category that has been hit particularly hard by this 
phenomenon is that of the bogus self-employed,  
a group which has been consistently growing in size 
since the year 2000.31, 32
Coordinated work is a typology of employment rela- 
tionship which allows for the service to be performed 
personally and continuously by the worker under the 
direction of the client. Yet, in order to be considered 
as genuine, the relationship cannot imply the client’s 
power of organization, including what concerns 
26 Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”,  
 Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
27 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
28 Eurofound, NEETs - Young people not in employment, education or training: Characteristics, costs and policy responses in Europe, 2012.
29 It is important to remember that Italy does not have a statutory minimum wage.
30  As with other indicators, in-work poverty affects more younger workers and presents high regional variability: Trentino Alto Adige, the best per-
former, has a 4.5% of in-work poors, six times less than the worst performer, Calabria. See: Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, “Povertà ed inclusione 
sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”, Quaderni della Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
31 European Parliament, Social protection rights of economically dependent self-employed workers, Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2013.
32 Eurofound, Italy: Self-Employed workers, 2009.
33  This rule does not apply in the following cases: when exceptions are set out by national collective bargaining agreements; in relation to intellec-
tual professions for which enrolment in specific professional registers is required; when the work activity is performed by members of boards of 
directors or of audit committees of businesses; when the work activity is performed for recreational sport organizations.
34 Source: ISTAT.
35  Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”, Fondazione  
G. Brodolini, 2016.
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due to inflation”.36 It is hardly surprising that a 
stronger redistributive effort has been requested by 
several NGOs.37
Increase intergenerational justice 
Italy ranks second to last in terms of intergenerational  
justice, only ahead of Greece. Italy had a higher  
than average youth unemployment rate as early as 
the 1980s,38 but the situation rapidly worsened with 
the outbreak of the crisis. The fragmentation of the 
labour market, protecting mainly the insiders,  
exacerbated the situation, as well as poor transitions 
from school to work.39 To make things worse, Italy  
is one of the demographically “oldest” countries in 
the EU and carries one of the highest public debt  
to GDP ratios (132.1%). The fiscal burdens for today’s 
young people, as well as future generations, are  
thus substantial. After the launch of the Youth 
Guarantee programme, Italy’s 2016 stability law 
promotes intergenerational staff turnover through 
voluntary measures, envisaging a phasing out  
mechanism that should promote knowledge transfers 
from older to younger workers, but it is of course  
too early to judge its effect. Moreover, trade unions 
have questioned the amount of resources allocated for 
the measure, and similar proposals in the past had 
limited effect because the older workers would lose 
both wages and working time.40 
Productivity stagnation
Productivity in Italy has been stagnant since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, when new technologies were  
rapidly improving production possibilities in other 
parts of the world. Several observers and decision 
makers identified a key underlying reason in the mis- 
alignments between productivity and wages. Based 
on this viewpoint, several measures were introduced 
in order to foster the diffusion of company-level 
and territorial contractual agreements following the 
framework agreement among social partners signed 
in 2009 (but not by the CGIL, the largest trade union 
confederation). The basic idea was to favour pro- 
ductivity growth through fiscal incentives on wages 
bargained at a “second-level”. This approach was 
not helped by the presence of a large proportion of 
SMEs, which indeed represent the vast majority of 
the Italian industrial system. In fact, the dimensional 
structure of Italian firms, which has changed very  
slowly over the years, maintaining a rather stable aver- 
age size below four employees, has contributed to  
the low rates of productivity growth. Also, owing to the  
introduction of a series of labour laws aimed at 
fostering labour market flexibility, the price of labour 
fell, at the margin, relative to capital, incentivising 
these small firms, characterised by limited distance 
between owners and managers and by a cautious 
attitude towards risk, to remain in the low value added 
and (low-skilled) labour intensive sector. This led  
to reduced investments in innovative capital and to  
delays in the reorganisation of working places,  
with negative effects also on total factor productivity. 
More innovative investments and improvements  
in human capital, as well as increases in R&D (which 
remains at 1.3% of GDP compared with the Europe 2020 
Strategy target set at 3%41) must hence be favoured 
through a set of policy measures which should include  
a new wage bargaining system aimed at fostering 
productivity growth.
The regional disparity between Northern and 
Southern Italy
Northern and Southern Italy performed in radically 
different ways following the creation of the unified 
state in 1861. Centuries spent under different rulers 
and political systems had contributed to what were 
initially very different levels of GDP, employment and  
development. However, it is only after World War II  
that these differences widened rapidly, despite massive 
investment in the South, mainly through the so-
called Cassa del Mezzogiorno. This agency, active 
from 1951 to 1992, provided funding on a grand scale 
36 Cotta, M., R. Maruhn, C. Colino, SGI 2015 Italy report, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
37 See, e.g., Caritas, Poverty and Inequalities on the Rise, 2015.
38 Source: Eurostat.
39 J. Dolado, “No Country for Young People? Youth Labour Market Problems in Europe”, 2015.
40  http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/labour-market/italy-new-solidarity-contracts-boost-inter- 
generational-staff-turnover
41 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/16_rd_target_02.pdf
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Source: Eurostat
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Figure 3
PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE UNDER 16 YEARS OLD AT RISK OF POVERTY, 2014
in %
 
Note: The dark bar is the Italian average and the two digit codes identify the region; from top  to bottom: VA = Valle d’Aosta; FVG = Friuli - Venezia Giulia;  
VE = Veneto; TAA = Trentino - Alto Adige; Lo = Lombardia; To = Toscana; ER = Emilia-Romagna; MA = Marche; AB = Abruzzo; LA = Lazio; PI = Piemonte;  
LI = Liguria; IT = Italy, average; UM = Umbria; BA = Basilicata; MO = Molise; SA = Sardegna; PU = Puglia; CL = Calabria; CA = Campania; SI = Sicilia. 
of €140 billion during its life,42 even though the proper 
use of such resources has been seriously questioned. 
An economic convergence took place shortly after the 
closure of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, but unfortu-
nately for the country it was a downward one.43 This 
regional effect cuts across all the statistical groups  
and indicators. The figure below illustrates the magni- 
tude of regional disparities through the different  
percentages of people under 16 at risk of poverty in 
2014. 
42 Stella, G. A., “Lo Spreco”, Dalai, 1999.
43 Felice, E., “Perché il Sud è rimasto indietro”, Il Mulino, 2014.
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The World Bank has recently identified the Italian 
welfare state as truncated.44 This definition stems 
from the fact that Italy allocates a high share of its  
GDP to social protection spending (close to 24% 
behind only Denmark, Sweden, and Finland), but 
performs very badly in the social assistance cov- 
erage of the bottom 20% of the population. In this 
regard, Italy outperforms only Greece and Spain.  
This highlights questionable management of resources 
in terms of protecting the most vulnerable members  
of Italian society. Removing inadequate protection has  
emerged as a clear priority for policy-makers even 
at European level, as testified by the 2015 Country 
Specific Recommendations for Italy:
“Italy has witnessed one of the highest increases in pov-
erty and social exclusion rates in the Union, with a  
particular impact on children. Social assistance schemes 
remain fragmented and ineffective in tackling this  
challenge with resulting substantive cost inefficiencies.”45 
In 2015, Italy was one of the two European countries 
without any comprehensive unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance program,46, 47 the other one 
being Greece. In 2016, a range of programmes will 
start to tackle this deficiency. More detail is present-
ed in the following pages. 
Italy was among the first countries seeking to intro-
duce, in 1997, a minimum income scheme (the so-
called “Reddito minimo di Inserimento”, RMI hence-
forth), following a 1992 European recommendation. 
The scheme was first piloted in 39 municipalities (a 
number that rose to 306 after 2000) and was designed 
to tackle both poverty and social exclusion. The RMI  
comprised two parts: one focusing on money transfers 
and the other on active labour market (and social) 
policies. Nevertheless, after an election round in 2001, 
which led to a radical change in the Italian political  
landscape, the RMI was no longer a priority on the 
agenda of the new government and it was abolished 
in 2002. The regions co-financed the final part of the 
program until its ultimate end in mid-2003. The RMI 
should have been replaced by an income of last resort 
(“Reddito di ultima istanza”), but the law introduc- 
ing it remained ill-defined and the project was never 
completed.48 
With the 2008 crisis, a European Commission recom- 
mendation49 reminded Member States of the im-
portance of income support policies, also because 
“Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights  
of the European Union provides for the right to social 
and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent  
existence for all those who lack sufficient resources.”50  
In this recommendation there is the first formulation 
of an integrated and active inclusion strategy, which 
should be complementary to the flexicurity approach. 
The strategy relies on three main pillars: adequate 
income support, inclusive labour market and access 
to quality services.
Pushed by internal pressure and the European institu- 
tions, Italian governments decided to actively and 
comprehensively tackle the poverty issue from 2008 
onwards, with a range of actions. 
3. 
Government (re)actions
44 World Bank, EU Regular Economic Report 2 – Sustaining Recovery, Improving Living Standards, Fall 2015.
45  Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Italy and Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme 
of Italy.
46 Esser, I., T. Ferrarini, K. Nelson, J. Palme, O. Sjöberg, Unemployment Benefits in EU Member States, Report for European Commission.  
 D-G Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion. Brussels: European Comission, 2013.
47 Unemployment assistance and social assistance are not contributory based, unlike in the case of unemployment insurance.
48 Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”,  
 Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2016.
49 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008H0867, EC recommendation 2008/867/CE
50 Ibid.
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The first measure approved was the Carta acquisti  
ordinaria (ordinary purchase card), which is a  
monthly €40 support for expenses related to eating, 
health and electricity/gas bills. It can reach €50  
for households using LPG or natural gas heating. The 
measure does not include active labour market  
policies and the target group is twofold: elderly people 
above the age of 65, with an annual income below 
€6,788.61 (€9,051.48 for the over-70s), and families 
with children up to three years of age and an ISEE 51 
below €6,788.61. From 2016, the budget set aside is 
€250 million.52
Another measure, introduced for the second semester  
of 2013 by article 60 of legal decree 5/2012, is the Social 
card sperimentale (experimental social card). It is 
called experimental because it was experimentally 
introduced in 12 cities with more than 250,000 inhab- 
itants.53 The budget was €50 million, and it could  
be spent on food or other basic goods. The target group 
is families with at least one person under 18 years  
of age, with no family member of working age listed 
as employed, an ISEE below €3,000 and movable  
assets below €8,000. The Social card sperimentale does  
not just provide income support, but includes acti- 
vation policies involving both the beneficiaries and 
the social policy administrations at municipality  
level. With law 208/2015, the Social card sperimentale 
was extended to the whole country, with the name  
of Sostegno per l’inclusione attiva (or active inclusion 
subsidy, SIA henceforth). Its budget for 2016 is €750 
million for income support measures, while 80% of the  
PON budget54 is earmarked for the active policies. 
From 2017 onwards, the yearly budget should reach 
€1 billion. The SIA is not a minimum income scheme 
for Italian citizens, a topic that has gained traction in  
recent years, but rather a means-tested subsidy 
targeting poor people. The SIA is not only a direct 
income support tool, but should be considered as a first 
step towards an holistic approach entailing a spe-
cific set of activation policies for beneficiaries. The 
monthly amount of SIA is €80 per family member, 
capped at €400 per family. The strict eligibility criteria  
are as follows:
•   being a European citizen;
•  living in Italy for the last 2 years;
•  ISEE below €3,000;
•  not being a SIA recipient in the last 6 months;
•   at least one family member under 18 years of age,  
or affected with disability, or a pregnant woman;
 •    availability to work, with no right to refuse a  
job offer; 
 •    receipt of benefits obtained in any capacity no 
higher than €600 (€900 for families with disabled 
people);
 •   not having in the last 12 months a car with cubic 
capacity greater than 1,300, or motorbikes with 
cubic capacity greater than 250, registered in the 
last three years; 
•    reaching the threshold of 35 out of 90 on a specific 
multidimensional indicator (taking into account 
economic situation, working situation and 
dependents). 55
The use of the multidimensional indicator is particu-
larly interesting, as it allows to draw comparisons 
among potential SIA beneficiaries and aim resources 
at the more difficult family situations. The SIA relies 
on the active participation of both local authorities and  
program beneficiaries, which should endorse what 
has been called Patto per l’inclusione attiva (active 
inclusion pact). Local welfare services should help  
the more marginalized members of society by trying to  
51  Acronym for Indicatore della Situazione Economica Equivalente, literally “equivalent economic situation indicator”. This indicator takes into 
account family income, some assets, the number of people in the family and other possible disadvantages, such as disabilities.
52  Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”, Fondazione 
G. Brodolini, 2016.
53 Bari, Bologna, Catania, Firenze, Genova, Milano, Napoli, Palermo, Roma, Torino, Venezia, Verona. The project has not started so far in Rome.
54 The PON Inclusione (the National Operational Programme targeting inclusion) is the national operative program, which has a €1.2 billion  
 budget for the period 2014-2020. It is financed by the European Social Fund and it aims at reducing the number of people living in disadvantaged 
 economic situation by 2.2 million. This should be done through the creation of a blueprint for poverty prevention policies, which can take the  
 form of “structural adjustments, pilot projects, social intervention innovative models and integration of people in poverty or at risk of social ex- 
 clusion”. The PON’s main objective is to sustain active inclusion in Italy through a universal income support instrument, not depending on  
 specific personal or family characteristics. 
55  Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”, Fondazione 
G. Brodolini, 2016. 
12  
sim europe POLICY BRIEF #2016/02
provide a tailor-made path towards social inclusion, 
while beneficiaries should keep to the rules: stay in 
contact with the services available, attend training 
sessions, demonstrate sufficient effort and commit-
ment, and actively look for a job. 
The SIA is a program which departs significantly from 
Italian standards, starting with the fact that this is 
the first time that a comprehensive anti-poverty plan 
has been launched.
Another particularly relevant program by Italian stand-
ards, which has been implemented in order to fight 
poverty, is the unemployment assistance program 
called Assegno di disoccupazione, or ASDI (literally  
unemployment allowance). As a classic unemployment 
assistance scheme, it is not financed by the worker’s 
contributions, but rather through standard taxation 
collected at the central level. The aim is to sustain  
incomes over a longer time span, in order to enable the 
unemployed to find a job opportunity (preferably one 
that better suits his/her skills and expertise), thereby 
reducing the risk of poverty.56 
The Fondo di aiuti europei agli indigenti, or FEAD (Fund 
for European Aid to the Most Deprived), is the Europe-
an framework plan aiming to help the most deprived 
European citizens by providing non-financial assis-
tance. The overall goal is to have 20 million fewer poor 
people across Europe by 2020 and Italy should con- 
tribute more than a tenth of this number. Here the plan  
replaces the old Programma di aiuti alimentari ai 
meno abbienti, which redistributed agricultural food 
surpluses but was judged not in line with Community  
agreements. The budget for the program is €790 million 
for the period 2014-2020, the biggest budget across 
all the Member States taking part in this fund. The 
range of FEAD measures is:
•    food distribution, with a budget of €480 million;
 •    distribution of school supplies such as books and 
pens to children belonging to families in severe  
financial difficulties, with a budget of €150 million;
 •    school meals services for the most economically 
and socially deprived sections of society, with a €77 
million budget;
•     targeted actions for the homeless, with a budget of 
€50 million.57
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung Reform Baro- 
meter,58 respondents to the questionnaire concerning 
poverty acknowledged that policies tackling this issue 
have been put into law and have sometimes even 
been implemented in the past; however, they also 
stressed that there was underfunding or simply no 
funding at all. The RMI, introduced at the beginning 
of this section, is a good example of this practice.  
The same applies to the Social Cohesion and Non-dis-
crimination dimension. Nevertheless, important 
measures have recently been launched and it is still 
too early to assess them properly. On the other hand, 
respondents do feel that the reforms are going in the 
direction of improved social welfare.
This is also reflected by Reform Barometer aggregates  
for the respective dimensions (see Figure 1): Within  
the Poverty Prevention dimension, the extent of reform 
activity is rated well below the EU average, whereas  
its quality ranks fourth highest. In the Social Cohesion 
and Non-discrimination dimension, it ranks fourth  
for reform activity and third for reform quality. In the  
Labour Market Access dimension, it has the sixth 
highest reform activity (with quality ranked 12th). 
While the overall Social Policy Reform Index59 ranks 
Italy 16th (out of 23 Member States covered), it comes 
a noteworthy 2nd in Social Cohesion. 
56  Quaderno “Povertà ed inclusione sociale in Italia: sfide e cambiamenti all’inizio della nuova programmazione dei Fondi strutturali”, Fondazione 
G. Brodolini, 2016. 
57 Ibid.
58 The SIM Europe Reform Barometer 2016 is based on a Europe-wide expert survey conducted in March 2016, asking participants to rate, for six 
dimensions of social inclusion and for each EU Member State, the relative need for reform, actual reform activity and its quality. The evaluation 
report will be published in the fall of 2016.
59 The Social Policy Reform Index is calculated on the basis of the answers collected in the Reform Barometer expert survey. It reflects both the 
reform activity (“To what extent did the government address relevant issues?”) and the reform quality (“Are the effects of introduced reforms 
expected to go in the right direction?”).
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Italy lags in the bottom quartile for the great majority 
of indicators in the Social Justice Index and it does  
not stand out as an interesting case study in the major- 
ity of its categories. The only ranking in which Italy 
does outperform the great majority of other European 
countries is the effect of socioeconomic background 
on students’ performance (where Italy ranks fourth 
overall), but even in this case two important caveats 
must be highlighted: the overall index for equitable  
education is not outstanding (21st position out of  
the 28 Member States) and the recent trend is negative  
(Italy was leading the EU in 2008, but both its rel- 
ative and absolute performance has worsened, with  
the index passing from an excellent 2.2 to a good- 
but-less-remarkable 3.0).60
Given the impressive effort during recent months to 
build new basic unemployment assistance and social  
assistance schemes while dealing with a complex macro- 
economic situation, Italy could be taken as a good ex- 
ample of social transition for Greece (the Hellenic state 
would indeed remain the only European country de-
void of both such schemes). The Commission recently 
asked Italy, with increasing insistence, to implement a 
minimum income scheme,61, 62 arguing that it would be 
cost-effective. Italy has not yet completed the process, 
but the measures that were passed in recent months 
(the above mentioned Carta acquisti ordinaria, So-
cial card sperimentale, Sostegno per l’inclusione 
attiva, Assegno di disoccupazione and Fondo di aiuti 
europei agli indigenti) go in the right direction. This 
attempt to establish a comprehensive and coherent 
social assistance scheme could be of great import 
for the Hellenic state as even in the case of Greece 
the Commission has highlighted the need for a 
broader anti-poverty strategy, setting quite ambitious 
targets.63
It is crucial for Italy to learn from other EU Member 
States how improvements can be made concerning 
intergenerational justice, which stands out as one of  
the country’s biggest problems. Here the models 
could be the Nordic and Baltic states but need to take 
into account the different age structure: the fact  
that Italy is among the four “oldest” countries in the 
EU, the low birth-rate and an increasing migration  
of younger people towards other EU countries also pre- 
sents further problems. This calls for rapid policy 
change and a major increase in employment oppor-
tunities, with a special focus on greater involvement of 
young people in the labour market.
As mentioned in the previous section, in terms of its  
social protection spending Italy ranks fourth in 
Europe, yet the protection of the poorer sections of 
society is limited, especially in terms of resources.  
In 2012, Italy spent almost 24% of its GDP on social  
protection, only one pp. less than Sweden and  
Finland, and at least as much as Austria, the Nether- 
lands and France.64 The country focuses its resources 
more on the protection of old people and families,  
and less on the protection of people with disabili- 
ties and on housing subsidies. Even though specific  
measures could be introduced – such as a means- 
tested guaranteed minimum income scheme on Aus- 
trian lines, which could be a feasible and socially 
desirable policy, considering the resources allocated65 
- a streamlining of the entire welfare system should 
aim to ensure greater equity and protection for those 
excluded from the labour market.
60 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
61 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/csr2015_council_italy_en.pdf
62 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/csr2016_italy_en.pdf
63 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/nrp2016_greece_en.pdf
64 World Bank, EU Regular Economic Report 2 – Sustaining Recovery, Improving Living Standards, Fall, 2015.
65 Ministry of Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, Austrian Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010,  
 Vienna, September 2008.
4. 
Comparison with other EU countries
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Tackling poverty is not the only issue that Italy has  
to face, as other employment and social issues mat-
ter greatly. As mentioned in the challenges section, 
effectiveness and efficiency remain matters for con-
cern within the whole Active Labour Market  
Policy field. Italy tends to be proactive in labour market 
legislation and ALMPs follow this pattern. In fact, 
whereas in the period 2010-2013 the EU average was  
roughly 14 ALMPs reforms per year, Italy’s rate of  
implementation was almost two times higher, with  
24 ALMPs legislative changes passed in those four 
years.66, 67 Nevertheless, the budget expressed in terms  
of percentage of GDP was very small. Italy spends  
less than 0.4% of its GDP on ALMPs, with the EU average 
standing at more than 0.6%.68 Breaking this number 
down by subcategories, Italy has an above average 
expenditure concerning employment incentives. Ex-
penditure on training and direct job creation is instead 
below average. Crucially, Italy lags behind in start-up 
incentives, labour market services and employment 
programmes for individuals with disabilities. It must 
improve the implementation of personalized assistance  
for specific groups, such as young people (one of the 
most effective form of ALMPs)69 and further develop 
evaluation and assessment practices, starting with 
the Youth Guarantee scheme, since no evidence is avail- 
able on the impact of concrete measures. Even those 
ALMPs with a budget in line with EU averages, such as  
wage and hiring subsidies, can function better,70 
while Italy has plenty to learn from training schemes 
in Germany, Denmark, Finland and Austria. 
Italy must also modernise its Public Employment Ser- 
vice, which has proved to be ineffective and in need  
of organizational restructuring. Reforms have recently  
been implemented with the aim of increasing ef-
ficiency in the Netherlands, the UK and in Estonia. 
Good results have been obtained by adapting new 
structures and linking benefits and employment ser-
vices more clearly.71, 72 Digitalization and an effective 
use of outsourcing have both also proven effective.73
Italy ranks fifth in Europe for the labour tax wedge, 
which significantly hampers growth.74 A tax shift 
such as the one being implemented in Belgium in 2016 
could free resources for companies and SMEs and  
allow them to invest more in both physical and human 
capital.75 The tax wedge is not, however, the only 
indicator of the country’s limited capacity to attract 
investment.
66 European Commission, Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, 2015.
67 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/labref/public/
68 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/labour-market-policy/database
69 http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Regina-Konle-Seidl-Active-Labour-Market-Policies-Bruegel-Presentation.pdf
70 http://ftp.iza.org/pp84.pdf
71 http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Dan-Finn-Active-Labour-Market-Policies-Bruegel-Presentation.pdf
72 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/25_almp_and_employment_services.pdf
73 Ibid.
74  Given the complexity of tax and benefits structures, we take into account an average single earner person. The data are taken from the tax 
and benefits indicators database of DG Economic and Financial Affairs, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/
tax_benefits_indicators/index_en.htm
75 It is to be noted that Belgium is one of the four European states that have a tax wedge higher than the Italian one.
15 
sim europe POLICY BRIEF #2016/02
5. 
Conclusion
Italy ranks third to last in the ranking of the time  
needed to enforce a contract among EU Member 
States, with 1,120 days (better than Greece and Slove- 
nia only).76 Luxembourg, the best performer in terms 
of both the number of days needed to enforce a con- 
tract (321) and of Foreign Direct Investment re- 
ceived (another category in which Italy has room for 
improvement), can represent a good case study for 
further reforms of the legal system. France might, on 
the other hand, be a good benchmark for reducing 
the length of court proceedings, given that Italy  
has the highest number of violations of reasonable 
time for a trial to take place, enshrined in the Euro-. 
pean Convention of Human Rights (article 6).77 As  
a result, Italy ranks only 22nd in the European ranking 
for ease of doing business, and 45th in the world.78 
Denmark and Sweden are the EU benchmark in this 
category and they should be taken as the model for 
getting credit and paying taxes. The UK and Lithua-
nia, on the other hand, represent good examples for 
starting a business and registering property. 
Italy entered the Great Recession with slow growth, 
stagnating productivity, declining macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the absence of a comprehensive 
and coherent system of unemployment and social 
assistance. Facing the need to quickly respond to an 
increasing default risk, expansionary fiscal policies 
were ruled out and the attempt to tackle the econom-
ic crisis resulted in an above average legislative out- 
put: from 2008 to 2013, EU Member States produced on  
average 73 labour market reforms,79 whereas Italy 
recorded 120 legislative changes.80 Such high produc-
tivity was not, however, matched by the establishment 
of effective policy evaluation systems. 
With some relief, due to an improved global outlook 
and the budget flexibility allowed at the European 
level, Italy has subsequently designed a more expan-
sionary policy and started to forge a basic unemploy-
ment and social assistance scheme. This vital step 
clearly moves in the right direction, but there is  
still a long way to go and the journey is likely to be full 
of challenges. Among them, the following obstacles 
appear the most important:
•    With the highest rate of NEET among all the 28 
Member States, more incisive action is required, 
starting with the improvement of the vocational 
training system and of the entire education system, 
with the aim of reducing skill mismatches.
•    Participation in the labour market must be streng- 
thened along with further improvements in the  
medium-term sustainability of the welfare state 
given the highest old age dependency ratio in the 
EU. This requires a greater involvement of women, 
the long-term unemployed and young people in the 
labour market. Female participation has increased 
significantly in comparison with the 1980s, but 
Italy still lags behind the other Member States. 
There is also a strong need for the establishment of 
a modern European system of care for the elder-
ly and children, along with moves to rebalance 
household duties and family care. Long-term 
unemployment has to be tackled too, as Italy ranks 
23rd in Europe for this indicator,81,82 and the long-
term unemployed face a higher risk of poverty 
and social exclusion. Many young people left the 
country during the crisis, helping their fami-
lies in the short term but reducing Italy’s future 
76 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts
77 Lanau, S., G. Esposito, S. Pompe, “Judicial System Reform in Italy - A Key to Growth”, IMF working Paper, 2014.
78 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
79 The number becomes 75 excluding the Croatia, for which reforms are considered only from 2012 onwards.
80 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/labref/public/
81 Schraad-Tischler, D., Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2015 Social Inclusion Monitor Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015.
82 After Greece, Spain, Croatia, Slovakia, and Portugal in 2015 according to Eurostat.
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competitiveness. This requires creating favourable 
conditions for their return.
•    Directly related to the above is the need to further 
reduce the tax wedge, shifting taxation onto other 
elements so as not to hamper growth, employ- 
ment and international competitiveness. A re-
duction of the barriers to business, especially in the 
product market, must also be sought, as well as a 
way to cut red tape for SMEs and start-ups. 
•    It seems difficult to foster productivity growth with- 
out realigning domestic expenditure on R&D (the 
indicator being at 1.26) with the EU average (equal 
to 2.01) and without supporting innovative invest-
ment and managerial talent.83
 
•    A sound and effective policy evaluation system 
must be created, starting with the new unemploy-
ment assistance and social assistance schemes, 
in order to optimise the available resources.
•    The wide regional disparity between Northern and 
Southern Italy must be addressed once and for all, 
seeking upward convergence. 
•    After five years of public expenditure cuts, improved  
economic growth gives more scope to introduce  
and develop long-awaited reforms. This must go 
hand in hand with the imperative goal of pro-
gressively reducing future budget deficits and the 
public debt to GDP ratio.
83 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Gross_domestic_expenditure_on_R%26D,_2003%E2%80%9313_ 
 (%25_of_GDP)_YB15.png
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ABOUT SIM EUROPE
The Social Inclusion Monitor (SIM) Europe is a new EU 
social-policy tool that is composed of two instruments.  
The Social Justice Index measures the level of social justice  
in the 28 EU member states, based on statistical data as  
well as assessments by selected experts. The Reform Baro-
meter assesses social-reform need, activity and quality in 
the 28 EU member states, based on a survey among several 
hundred experts from across Europe. Both instruments  
are updated annually.
www.social-inclusion-monitor.eu
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